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Abstract
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an intrusive attempt, which aims to force a desig-
nated resource (e.g., network bandwidth, processor time or memory) to be unavailable
to its intended users. This attack is launched either by deliberately exploiting system
vulnerabilities of a victim (e.g., a host, a router, or an entire network) or by ﬂooding
a victim with large volume of useless network traﬃc. Since 1990s, DoS attacks have
emerged as a type of the most severe network intrusive behaviours and have posed
serious threats to the infrastructures of computer networks and various network-based
services.
This thesis aims to provide an intelligent and eﬀective solution for DoS attack
detection. Unlike the related works based on machine learning and statistical analysis,
this thesis suggests to treat network traﬃc records as images and to redeﬁne the DoS
attack detection problem as a computer vision task.
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, this thesis ﬁrst conducts a detailed lit-
erature review on the state of the art in DoS attack detection. Then, it analyses and
chooses the most appropriate mechanisms for DoS attack detection. Afterwards, it de-
signs a general system framework for DoS attack detection with respect to the chosen
mechanisms. Furthermore, two Multivariate Correlation Analysis (MCA) approaches
are proposed based on two techniques, namely Euclidean distance and triangle area.
1
Abstract 2
These two proposed MCA approaches provide accurate description for network traﬃc
records and facilitate conversion of network traﬃc into the respective images.
In addition, this thesis proposes a DoS attack detection system, in which the im-
ages of network traﬃc are served as the observed objects and the task of DoS attack
detection is reformulated as a computer vision problem, namely image retrieval. This
proposed DoS attack detection system applies a widely used dissimilarity measure,
namely the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD), to object classiﬁcation. The EMD takes
cross-bin matching into account and provides a more accurate evaluation on the dis-
similarity between distributions than some other well-known dissimilarity measures,
such as Minkowski-form distance Lp and X
2 statistics. The merits of the EMD facil-
itate the capability of our proposed system with eﬀective detection.
Last but not least, our intelligent and eﬀective solutions, including the two pro-
posed MCA approaches and the EMD-based DoS attack detection system, are eval-
uated using the KDD Cup 99 dataset. The evaluation results illustrate that our
proposed MCA approaches provide accurate characterisation for network traﬃc, and
the proposed detection system can detect unknown DoS attacks and outperforms two
state-of-the-art approaches.
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